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Discovering Collaborative Advantage:  
The Contributions of Goal Categories and Visual Strategy Mapping 
By John M. Bryson, Fran Ackermann and Colin Eden 
Abstract 
 Collaboration can make sense when there is some sort of ³FROODERUDWLYHDGYDQWDJH´ to be 
gained, meaning organizations can achieve something together that they cannot easily achieve by 
themselves. Unfortunately, the literature is essentially silent on how to identify collaborative 
advantage. This article addresses this shortcoming in the theory of collaborative advantage for 
public purposes by proposing a set of goal categories that may be used to help articulate 
collaborative advantage, and the use of visual strategy mapping as part of a facilitated group 
process to figure out what the collaborative advantage might be. Collaborative advantage as 
normally understood consists of shared core goals. Collaborative advantage for public purposes 
should take into account public values beyond shared core goals. 
Practitioner Points 
x Treat goals as a networked system of aspirations, rather than as a simple hierarchy. 
x Consider all of the possible categories of goals: core goals, shared core goals, public value 
goals beyond shared core goals, negative-avoidance goals, negative public value 
consequences beyond shared core goals, and not-my-goals. 
x Organizations from all sectors may and often do have contributions to make to collaborative 
advantage for public purposes. 
 
Many scholars have argued that a new approach to public management is emerging that 
goes beyond traditional public administration and the New Public Management (e.g., Moore, 
2013; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2015). The new approach is emerging as a consequence of the 
importance of public problems facing the world and the realization that governments cannot by 
themselves effectively address many of these problems. There is also a well-founded worry that 
public values have been and will be lost as a result of a powerful anti-government rhetoric and a 
host of market-based and performance-based reforms (Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg, 2014; 
Kettl, 2015). While government clearly has a special role to play as a creator of public value and 
guarantor of public values and the public sphere, in a market-based democracy government is not 
the owner of all the processes and institutions having public value potential or obligations (Peters 
and Pierre, 1998). Collaboration and cross-sector collaboration have therefore emerged as 
hallmarks of the new approach in which public managers frequently must work jointly with 
nonprofit organizations, businesses, the media, and citizens to accomplish public purposes (e.g., 
2¶/HDU\DQG%LQJKDP$JUDQRII; Ansell, 2011; Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015).  
Collaboration is a way of achieving together what collaborating organizations cannot 
achieve separately, and the gain is UHIHUUHGWRDV³FROODERUDWLYHDGYDQWDJH´.DQWHUWhen 
public organizations are involved, collaborative advantage presumably includes direct or indirect 
gains in creating public value. Not surprisingly, elected officials, practitioners and scholars 
frequently tout the benefits of collaboration, which is often required, if not actually mandated, 
because the presumed benefits ± the collaborative advantage ± are so obvious. Or perhaps more 
realistically, there is no other viable option. ,QGHHGRIWHQRUJDQL]DWLRQVPXVW³IDLOLQWR
FROODERUDWLRQ´KDYLQJWULHGWRJRLWDORQHDQGQRWVXFFHHGHG%U\VRQDQG&URVE\
Unfortunately, while the argument for collaboration may be strong, the empirical literature is 
quite clear that any form of collaboration is usually difficult and success is hardly assured 
(Huxham and Vangen, 2005; Thomson and Perry, 2006; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, 2006, 
2015).  
At least a part of the problem may be that the collaboration literature is essentially silent 
on exactly how to discern collaborative advantage other than to engage in dialogue and 
deliberation, often over extended periods of time (e.g. Gray, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Huxham and 
Vangen, 2005; Innes and Booher, 2010). Other literatures offer more in the way of principles and 
guidance (Eden and Huxham 2001), but still fall short on detailed specifics about the mechanics 
and fine-grained detail of identifying collaborative advantage. For example, the literatures on 
interest-based negotiations, conflict management, facilitation, and consensus building literatures 
provide useful principles and considerable general guidance for getting to win-win solutions in 
group settings (e.g., Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 2011; Coleman, Deutsch, and Marcus, 2014; 
Schwarz, 2002; Hunter, 2009; Susskind, McKearnen, and Thomas-Larner, 1999). The 
deliberative democracy and civic engagement literatures also offer useful general guidance and 
numerous examples of how groups have found common ground (e.g., Nabatchi, et al., 2012; 
Nabatchi and Leighninger, 2015). Additionally, the literatures on co-production (e.g., Alford, 
2009; Voorberg, Bekkers, and Tummers, 2014), collective impact (e.g., Kania and Kramer, 
2011), evaluation (e.g., Wholey, Hatry, and Newcomer, 2010; Patton 2011), and problem solving 
(e.g., van Aken, Berends, and van der Bij, 2012) have important insights to contribute. All of 
these literatures, however, are vague on the specific details of how to come up with 
collaboratively advantageous solutions.  
In this article we offer one possible way of addressing this serious gap in the theory of 
collaboration. Our research question is: how can potential collaborators be helped to figure out 
what the collaborative advantage might be for them separately and together in particular 
circumstances? In response to this question, we present a research and practice-based approach 
to helping governments and their partners discern collaborative advantage through use of a 
specific set of goal categories and facilitated strategy mapping. Of these two, we believe the goal 
categories represent the article¶Vmost significant contribution. 
We proceed as follows. First, we introduce six goal categories that help advance an 
understanding of collaboration for public purposes. These include: an organization¶VFRUHJRDOV, 
core goals shared by the collaborating organizations, and public value goals beyond core goals 
and shared core goals. Also included are: negative-avoidance goals, negative public value 
consequences beyond core goals and shared core goals, and not-my-goals. We also introduce the 
idea of a goals system, which shows all of these goals as a network (c.f., Eden and Ackermann, 
2001). Second, we introduce the process of visual strategy mapping and show how it relates to 
the goal concepts.  The method deliberately seeks to acknowledge the systemic nature of goals 
systems. Third, we present a brief illustrative case example in which the goal categories and 
strategy mapping helped identify the collaborative advantage. Fourth, we discuss in more depth 
issues related to the approach and the case. Finally, we conclude with two tentative propositions 
meant to guide future research.  
We introduce the propositions here, however, to alert the reader to what we see as the 
significance of this article and to summarize the argument. First, we believe that in comparison 
with normal dialogue, potential collaborators in a group using the goal categories and visual 
strategy mapping will have: (1) a clearer, more complete, and systemic understanding of exactly 
what the potential collaborative advantage is; (2) how they might achieve it and with what risks; 
and (3) therefore have a better basis for deciding whether to proceed. Second, they will also have 
a better understanding of the potentially broader collaborative advantage that might be achieved 
by considering public values (benefits and costs broadly conceived) that go above and beyond 
those for which the collaborators are willing to hold themselves accountable. 
Understanding Collaborative Advantage in Terms of Goals  
We argue that collaborative advantage is most easily understood through elaborating 
theory relating to organizational goals and strategic management. Doing so can help practitioners 
and researchers better address the challenges posed by collaboration. These challenges include 
the need to address a public problem where no organization is wholly in charge and where the 
organizations involved have incompletely overlapping and often conflicting goals (Vangen and 
Huxham, 2013). For example, as Bozeman (2007, 2) notes, ³almost all problems have multiple 
competing stakeholders seeking to maximize conflicting values,´ and the values may vary from 
selfish to altruistic. On the other hand, as Freeman, et al. (2010, 284) observe, ³QRWHYHU\
interaction is a zero-sum game and not every interaction has a win-win solution, but we should 
do our best to look for the win-win before jumping to other sub-optimal solutions.´ The 
challenge is that organizations engaging in collaborations may need help in identifying shared 
JRDOVWKDWGRQRWQHJDWLYHO\DIIHFWWKHVHRUJDQL]DWLRQV¶DELOLW\WRGHOLYHURQFRUHRUJDQL]DWLRQDO
goals. Indeed, they may often need help in articulating their own organization-specific goals 
(Vangen and Huxham, 2012, 2013).  
The Goal Categories 
 We propose the overarching notion of a goals system and six important categories of 
goals that are likely to be part of the system (see Table 1). Treating goals as a system means 
viewing goals as a linked and hierarchically organized network of shared and not-shared goals 
within and across organizations (Ackermann and Eden, 2011; Vangen and Huxham, 2012).1 The 
work of the collaborators must join in such a way that collaborative advantage can be discerned 
and realized via collective creation and assignment of meaning, along with the articulation of 
action responsibilities tied to a subset of the goals system ± specifically, the subset that defines 
collaborative advantage in the situation at hand. 
Insert Table 1 About Here (Goal Categories and Collaborative Advantage)  
The first two goal categories will be relatively familiar, while the remaining four may not 
be. The six categories are: core goals, core goals shared across organizations, and public value 
goals beyond core goals, negative-avoidance goals, negative public value consequences beyond 
shared core goals, and not-my-goals. Public value and negative public value consequences are 
new to the collaboration literature and to the theory of collaborative advantage. Core goals are 
those goals that are at the core of, or central to, the organization doing what must do to succeed. 
IQRWKHUZRUGVLIWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQGRHVQ¶WGRUHDVRQDEO\ZHOOLQDFKLHYLQJWKHVHJRDOVLW very 
likely will face serious consequences and indeed may cease to exist (Eden and Ackermann, 
2013). For public organizations, many or most of the core goals may be mandated. Shared core 
goals are core goals that are the same for two or more organizations and cannot easily be 
achieved except by collaborating. 2 These are the goals that capture what is ordinarily meant by 
collaborative advantage (Kanter, 1994; Vangen and Huxham, 2012).  
There is a third category of goals that are not core to the collaborating organizations, but 
do result from the collaborating partners¶MRLQWZRUN and also should be considered a part of 
public value-oriented collaborative advantage. These are public value goals beyond core goals. 
These are goals, or value achievements, that are valued by the public or enhance the public 
sphere (Beck Jorgensen and Bozeman, 2007; Benington and Moore, 2011; Bozeman and 
Johnson, 2014) and go above and beyond core goals without harming the attainment of the 
collaborators' individual and shared core goals. In economics terms, these may be thought of as 
positive externalities (Weimer and Vining, 2010), or a bonus above and beyond the 
accomplishment of core goals. ,Q0RRUH¶VSXEOLFYDOXHDFFRXQWLQJVFKHPHWKHVHZRXOG
be positive consequences of government action that should be added to the benefit side of the 
ledger. Unfortunately, governments and their partners may well not be willing to be held 
accountable for these goals, since their achievement is likely to be beyond the control of the 
separate organizations.  
Also, just to be clear, all of the goals of collaborating public organizations, whether 
shared or not, presumably should be public value goals if these organizations are responsive to 
their authorizing legislation, applicable mandates, and the broader framework of public 
governance (Moore, 1995, 2013; Rosenbloom, 2014). In contrast, not all of the goals of 
collaborating for-profit or non-profit organizations are likely to be public value goals (Bozeman, 
2007). 
 The concept of a negative-avoidance goal may strike readers as odd, perhaps even 
oxymoronic. At the extreme, negative-avoidance goals are disaster-avoidance goals (Eden and 
Ackermann, 2013). The need for recognizing negative-avoidance goals occurs for two reasons. 
First, it may be necessary to develop strategies to avoid a disaster, i.e., the negative avoidance 
goal+ (typically called risk-management strategies; see Webster and Stanton, 2015). Second, it 
may be important to acknowledge the likely and perhaps inevitable negative consequences of 
doing something to attain positive goals, and therefore important to develop strategies for their 
avoidance, if possible, or effective management, if inevitable.  
The negative-avoidance goal thus has the same general location in a goals system as a 
goal, but represents an acknowledged negative, or even disastrous, potential outcome to be 
avoided. ,Q0RRUH¶VSXEOLFYDOXHDFFRXQWLQJVFKHPHWKH negative consequences of a 
strategy would show up on the cost side of the ledger. For example, in military operations a 
natural consequence of pursuing core goals is very often ZKDWLVUHIHUUHGWRDV³FROODWHUDO
damage´VRPHWKLQJPLOLWDU\FRPPDQGHUVJHQHUDOO\DFNQRZOHGJHcan happen and will develop 
strategies to avoid. Explicitly seeking to avoid collateral damage would be a negative-avoidance 
goal for the organization, if the organization cared about doing so. Otherwise, collateral damage 
would just be an unintended consequence. The importance of negative-avoidance goals is that 
often acknowledging their significance for the success of the organization is what drives efforts 
to collaborate. In other words, tKHVHRUJDQL]DWLRQV¶FROODERUDWLRQstrategies are driven in part by 
trying to avoid these negative outcomes (Bryson and Crosby, 2008). If a specific negative-
avoidance goal is shared by the collaborating organizations, then it, too, should be considered 
part of collaborative advantage. 
Negative public value consequences beyond core goals are, as their name implies, 
recognized undesirable consequences of pursuing a strategy that may accomplish core goals and 
shared core goals, but epiphenomenally diminishes public value(s) or diminishes the public 
sphere. These negative goal consequences also should be considered when collaborative 
advantage is conceived broadly as taking public values, benefits, and costs more fully into 
account. ,QHFRQRPLFVWHUPVWKHVHPD\EHWKRXJKWRIDVQHJDWLYHH[WHUQDOLWLHVRULQ0RRUH¶V
(2013) public value accounting scheme, these would also be entered on the cost side of the 
ledger.  
Finally, not-my-goals are goals claimed by some organization, but not by others. For 
WKHVHRWKHURUJDQL]DWLRQVWKH\DUH³\RXUJRDOVEXWQRWPLQH.´Although these other organizations 
may nonetheless willingly make a contribution to achieving them, they are not prepared to be 
held accountable for their attainment. In short, the not-my-goals are those not shared or claimed 
DVSDUWRIDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VRUFROODERUDWLRQ¶VJRDOV\VWHP. Collaboration typically involves 
mixed-motive situations for the collaborators ± ZKDW9DQJHQDQG+X[KDPFDOO³DWDQJOHG
ZHE´± in which not all or even most goals are shared. The unshared goals are not-my-goals for 
the organizations that do not want to be held accountable for their achievement, even though they 
might actively support their achievement in tangible ways.  
A reviewer argued that this category was either unnecessary, or worse, useless, because it 
could become a catchall for everything the parties will not own and thus is mostly an indicator of 
a desire to avoid accountability. Our experience, however, is that the category is extremely 
useful to practitioners. The category helps clarify for the managers and their collaborators what 
they are willing to contribute toward ± a positive public value contribution ± but not be held 
accountable for as they have so little control over it. In other words, the category helps managers 
orient their strategies for attaining core goals in such a way that they also help attain public value 
goals that are for them not-my-goals, meaning goals for which they are willing to be held 
accountable. As will be seen later, important public value goals beyond core and shared core 
goals can easily fall into this category. 
In sum, regardless of sector, collaborative advantage as normally understood consists of 
shared core goals. A broader public-value focused view of collaborative advantage consists of 
taking into account shared core goals, public value goals beyond shared core goals, and negative 
public value consequences of shared core goals (see Table 1). In certain circumstances, negative-
avoidance goals and not-my-goals may also be considered part of collaborative advantage. We 
believe that if the emerging approach to public administration is to fulfil its potential, it should 
find way of incorporating this broader view of collaborative advantage into its theory and 
practices. 
Unclear Boundaries and Ambiguity in the Goal Categories 
We hasten to acknowledge somewhat unclear boundaries between the six goal categories, 
especially in practice. For example, there are likely to be significant overlaps in practice between 
not-my-goals, public value goals beyond core goals, and negative public value consequences 
beyond core goals. Further, a certain amount of goal ambiguity is likely in practice even when 
the category to which a goal belongs is clear&KXQDQG5DLQH\¶VGHILQe goal ambiguity as 
the extent to which an organizational goal or set of goals allows leeway for interpretation. We 
think it makes sense to extend &KXQDQG5DLQH\¶VGHILQLWLRQbeyond organizations to 
collaborations and beyond core goals to shared core goals and the other goal categories.  
The lack of clear goal category boundaries and goal ambiguity are useful prompts in 
practice for management teams to sort out ownership of, and accountability for, goals. 
Ambiguity can also be important during the early stages of negotiation, in which some degree of 
meaning equivocality helps advance conversation (Fisher, Ury and Patton, 2011). The mapping 
process discussed in the next section uses a causal linking process through which meaning is 
refined through dialogue and deliberation and the co-creation of a networked goals system 
comprised of all or most of the goal categories. Meaning is gradually refined as a goal is 
understood in the context of the adjacent goals in the goals system, whereby DJRDO¶Vmeaning 
derives from supporting goals and the goals it supports. 
Visual Strategy Mapping 
Visual strategy mapping can use the above six goal categories in order to help 
organizations develop a goals system that clarifies the collaborative advantage to be gained by 
working together. The strategy elaboration process, however, is only touched upon in this paper 
due to space limitations.  
Visual strategy mapping LVDQLPSRUWDQWHOHPHQWRIWKHQDVFHQWEXWJURZLQJ³YLVXDOWXUQ´
in organization studies and practice (Bell, Schroeder, and Warren, 2013) that complements, in 
the case of strategy mapping, WKHEHWWHUGHYHORSHG³OLQJXLVWLFWXUQ´LQRUJDQL]DWLRQDOand strategy 
research (Ford and Ford, 1995; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2000). Visual approaches are being 
used to develop, for example, theory of change models, logic models, public service business 
process maps,  public and non-profit business models, and, of course, strategy maps.  
Visual strategy mapping typically relies on group process facilitation, pragmatic 
reasoning through dialogue and deliberation (Ansell, 2011), negotiation, and visual 
representation of statements linked by arrows to show causality and interrelatedness of 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶DUJXPHQWV. The process helps participants ³see´ what each other is saying, 
XQGHUVWDQGHDFKRWKHU¶VYLHZVGHYHORSDFRPPRQODQJXDJHDQGLGHDOO\WKURXJKGLDORJXHDQG
deliberation reach common agreement and commitment to mission, goals and strategies. Often 
the group mapping is computer assisted.  
In the case presented this article we used a particular approach to visual strategy mapping 
developed by Eden and Ackermann (Eden and Ackermann, 1998; Bryson, et al., 2004; 
Ackermann and Eden, 2011; and Bryson, Ackermann, and Eden, 2014). We used this approach 
because its developers specifically apply visual strategy mapping in public-sector contexts and 
because the approach allows potential collaborators to clarify the goals specific to each 
organization and the collaboration. The approach is therefore especially suited to our purpose.  
Visual strategy mapping is a causal mapping process. A causal map is a statements-and-
arrows diagram. The arrows indicate how one idea or action leads to another in a means-ends 
relationship. IQRWKHUZRUGVDQDUURZPHDQV³PLJKWFDXVH´³PLJKWOHDGWR´³PLJKWUHVXOWLQ´
or some other kind of influence relationship. The term causation is thus used loosely, but is still 
meant to indicate a plausible understanding about how to change some aspect of the world. Note, 
however, that a cause-and-effect relationship specifically maps out influence, not chronology. In 
a visual strategy map the statements represent potential actions that, if taken, are presumed to 
cause a given outcome(s). Each action in turn is informed by actions that support it as 
explanations (in-arrows), and each action may be an outcome (out-arrow) of earlier actions. As a 
result, statements on a map can be both an action (explanation) and an outcome (consequence).  
By using a few simple but important rules for formulating statements and creating links, 
visual strategy mapping makes it possible to articulate a large number of statements and their 
interconnections in such a way that people can know what to do in an area (issue) of concern, 
how to do it, and why, since each chain of arrows indicates the causes and consequences of an 
idea or action.  The maps then help focus dialogue and deliberation on which possible statements 
would or should be chosen and classed as important values, mission, goals, strategies, actions, 
and underlying assumptions. In other words, the logic structure of a visual strategy map is the 
same as that of a strategic plan ± the difference being that the strategy map details the logic that 
holds the statements together.  
The more deeply individuals engage in developing, wrestling with the meaning of, and 
revising maps, the more the maps act as a vehicle for negotiating agreements that are owned by 
all in the group. These agreements can EHFRPHFUXFLDO³PLFURIRXQGDWLRQV´RIagreed goals and 
ultimately implemented strategy (Barney and Felin, 2013). In relation to discovering 
collaborative advantage, it is important to emphasize that in practice mapping typically helps 
groups articulate the collaborative advantages (and disadvantages) that they otherwise would 
find difficult or even impossible to voice. Depending on the situation, the resulting maps may 
include anywhere from two dozen to hundreds of statements. 
In a facilitated group strategy mapping session, possible issues/actions are solicited from 
members of the group by having them write down action statements individually on separate 
self-adhesive cards, one statement per card, or else by having individuals enter their action 
statements via a wirelessly connected computer network that can project all responses onto a 
large screen visible to the group. A facilitator helps guide the group as members explore how 
they believe the statements are causally connected ± thus creating a causal map ࡳ and ultimately 
characterized according to various categories (e.g., the goal categories mentioned above, 
strategies, or actions). New statements are added and older statements may be modified or 
dropped as the conversation unfolds.  
A computerized group support system (GSS) was used in the illustrative case described 
later.  A computer-based group support system can help increase the effectiveness of the process 
in two ways: First, using a network of tablets connected to a wireless network speeds the 
SURGXFWLRQRILGHDVYLDSDUDOOHOSURFHVVLQJ6HFRQGSDUWLFLSDQW¶VUHVSRQVHVFDQEHRIIHUHG
anonymously, which means that especially during the early stages of a workshop creativity is 
more likely. This means that the probability is higher that shared core goals and public value 
goals beyond core and shared goals (along with the other categories of goals) will surface.3 For 
further discussion of GSSs, see Lewis, 2010. 
Visual strategy mapping as a part of strategic management prompts users to view goals 
and strategy as focused on ways to change an organization and its relationship to other 
organizations and stakeholders, and often to important parts of its broader environment. For 
example, goals and strategy might be focused on improving products and services, relationships 
with key stakeholders, or ways to collaborate with other organizations. Effectively managing 
strategic change ± as opposed to just being lucky ± necessarily requires at least a reasonable 
understanding of causal relationships. Causal mapping therefore becomes a useful strategic 
management tool. As Ackermann and Eden (2011, 10) point out more generally, ³DFDXVDOPDS
JUDSKLFDOO\SUHVHQWVWKHEDVLVIRUDFWLRQDQGFKDQJH´ 
An Illustrative Case 
We illustrate the approach to establishing collaborative advantage with an example from 
Europe featuring a for-profit multi-national power generation utility and its public regulator. The 
case is an illustrative example meant to demonstrate a reasonable claim that the goal categories 
and visual strategy mapping might help collaborating organizations discern collaborative 
advantage and advance the common good ± though with no guarantees that they will. The case is 
chosen in part because it fits with the emerging approach to public administration. Specifically, 
the case shows how public value can be created in areas where it must be co-produced with 
nongovernmental actors; government has a special role as a guarantor of public values; public 
management makes an important, but not the only contribution; and democratic and 
collaborative governance are involved. The cases show what Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011) 
FDOO³SULYDWHVHFWRUUROHVIRUSXEOLFJRDOV´DQG.HWWOFDOOs ³LQWHUZHDYLQJSXEOLFIXQFWLRQV
DQGSULYDWHKDQGV´ 
The case involves a necessary though informal collaboration between a European 
FRXQWU\¶VJRYHUQPHQWUHJXODWRUDQGDPXOWL-national power generation utility subject to regular 
inspections and broader involvements by the regulator with regard to existing plants and 
development of new plants. Two of the co-authors were involved in the case. They had worked 
with each organization together and separately over a number of years. Each of the organizations 
requested their involvement in facilitating a negotiation designed to enable each organization to 
achieve its own goals and yet work more constructively with its partner. In short, as Sagawa and 
6HJDOVD\³,QZRUNLQJPRUHFORVHO\WRJHWKHURUJDQL]DWLons need not, and should 
QRWDEDQGRQWKHLUFHQWUDOPLVVLRQV´Note that the case is not an example of negotiated rule-
making; instead, it focuses on the creation of a joint goals system. 
2YHUWKHSHULRGRIWKHIDFLOLWDWLRQVXSSRUWWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQV¶UHODtionship with one 
another had changed in fundamental ways in keeping with the trust-building cycle identified by 
Huxham and Vangen (2005): Mutual trust developed, ways of working changed, and most 
importantly they reached a high level of appreciation that each organization had to meet specific 
core goals that were often apparently in conflict across the two organizations. As in most 
countries, a regulator must retain absolute independence and so cannot become either a formal 
collaborator or formal partner, but at the same time the government regulatory agency and the 
business needed to be able to work together productively as they had no real alternative to being 
involved with each other. In addition, both organizations recognized that important public values 
were at stake ± that is, the safety of the public and security of the power supply. 
We focus on a two-party collaboration for ease of presentation and because of space 
limitations. The case is hardly representative of the population of all multi-party collaborations, 
so generalizing from this specific case to other cases is clearly problematic. Nonetheless, in our 
experience the approach may be extended to larger multi-party collaborations. Doing so will 
require more workshops and time to help each organization separately develop its own goals 
system and for the group of organizations to develop a shared goals system. We discuss 
challenges of using the process for larger collaborations in the conclusions section.   
Three Workshops 
The prospect of a massive and hugely expensive project involving major new power 
generation facilities had emerged. Both organizations believed that it was crucial for them to 
develop a strategy for effective joint working on the project. They were thus starting with an 
important link between them ± a shared general sense of the problem they needed to solve (Gray, 
1989). Each organization decided it would be appropriate to work separately with the co-authors 
to use visual strategy mapping to develop an organization-specific goals system for the new 
project. They would then come together to understand how these separate goals systems related 
to one another and to explore how they might develop a joint goals system that recognized their 
different and unshared objectives as well as any shared goals. In other words, developing a joint 
goals system was the starting point for developing strategies to achieve the shared goals. This 
initial process is the focus of this paper. 
The first workshop involved the top management team of the regulator, the second that of 
the utility, and the third workshop involved both top management teams (the ten most senior 
people from the regulator and seven from the utility company). Exhibit 1 presents an overview of 
the process used by these two organizations to figure out the collaborative advantage to be 
gained from working together. 
Insert Exhibit 1 About Here 
The process was initially ³VWUDWHJLFLVVXHVrisk´ driven. When collaborators seek to 
determine the goals for a project to which they will commit ± especially a project of this 
magnitude ± understanding the perceived risks is often of paramount importance because of their 
actual or potential link to negative-avoidance goals. In practice, however, when a facilitator asks 
team members for risks, issues also emerge, and when a facilitator asks for issues, risks emerge. 
While the terms thus are analytically distinct, in practice they are typically treated 
synonymously. Thus, in order to elicit as wide a range of issues and risks as possible, asking for 
strategic issues/risks works best. In this case the teams therefore separately identified strategic 
issues/risks that they believed would significantly affect the future success of their organization 
and the nascent project without pre-defining what success might be. They then identified and 
reflected upon the interdependencies between the strategic issues/risks to create an initial visual 
representation, or map, of the network of issues/risks needing to be addressed. The 
interdependencies were captured through arrows representing causality ± clarifying which issue 
may lead to another issue.  
The next step was exploring the possible consequences of the issues/risks. Issues/risks are 
only issues/risks if they enable or undermine achieving something valued, and thus ³ODGGHULQJ
XS´ from the issues/risks to their consequences allowed for the emergence of goals. Sometimes 
these were immediate consequences of the issues/risks; in other instances, further issues/risks 
were surfaced before resulting in a goal. Once the goals had been identified, the same process of 
considering interdependencies was undertaken. This process enabled the team to create a goals 
system and, based on that, a first draft of an emergent organizational mission or purpose with 
regard to the project, which comes from an understanding of the way in which addressing key 
strategic issues/risks undermines or supports goals.  
Beck -¡UJHQVHQDQG%R]HPDQFRPPHQWWKDW³LIWKHUHLs any single item for a 
public values research agenda, it is developing approaches to sorting out values and making 
VHQVHRIWKHLUUHODWLRQVKLSV´8VXDOO\DV\VWHP of goals (or values) portrays broadly based and 
fairly generic goals at the top of a hierarchy (Eden and Ackermann, 2001; Eden and Ackermann, 
2013). In businesses these generic goals will be statements such as increase revenue, better 
control of costs, or increase motivation of all staff. The ultimate top of the hierarchy is likely to 
be increase profitability, increase profit, or increase shareholder value ± goals common to all for-
profit organizations. In public organizations the superordinate goal is often a legally mandated 
mission, while in non-profit organizations it similarly may be the mission. These generic goals 
do not distinguish one organization from another in the same sector. Thus, it is the more specific 
goals that underpin or help achieve the generic goals that define the purpose of an organization.  
6KDUHGFRUHJRDOVWKDWFRPSOHPHQWHDFKRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VLQGLYLGXDOJRDOVRSHUDWLRQDOL]H
collaborative advantage, and facilitate achievement of a win-win outcome beyond what the 
organizations could achieve themselves (Fisher, 2014). Without a graphical representation of a 
means-ends network and hierarchy, partners may be unclear about what specific shared core 
goals the partnership could achieve. Thus a goals system helps clarify what the shared goals are 
and how they are linked to other core goals. As Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman (2007, 370) note, 
³1HLJKERUYDOXHV>DGMDFHQWLQWKHPHDQV-ends network] are important in two ways. First, 
identifying neighbor values helps define in greater detail the value used as the starting point. 
Second, the number of neighbor vaOXHVSURYLGHVDFOXHDERXWWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHYDOXH«RQH
RIWKHYDOXHVPD\KDYHDSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRQWKHRWKHU´$V.HHQH\DOVRREVHUYHV³LW
LVQDWXUDOWRVWUXFWXUHDVHWRIREMHFWLYHVRUHTXLYDOHQWO\YDOXHFULWHULDLQWRDKLHUDUFK\´ 
Each of the two initial workshops resulted in an organization-specific goals system map ± 
consisting of only the goals and their interdependencies. The aim was to ensure that the meaning 
of any one goal was informed by the other goals that helped achieve it (i.e., that linked into it), as 
well as the other goals that it helped to achieve (i.e., to which it linked out). During a final 
review of the map, participants crafted appropriate aspirational wording for the goals.  
The third joint workshop occurred within a week of the other workshops to ensure that 
the content was still fresh in memory. Before the workshop the facilitators engaged in additional 
preparation. First, they examined the two goals systems to identify possible duplicate goals, 
which would indicate potentially shared goals across the organizations. Second, they looked for 
possible ways of linking goals in one system to goals in the other using causal argumentation. 
The majority of these links emerged during the two individual workshops with a few being 
introduced by the facilitators based on the conversations held in the individual workshops. Third, 
these two steps resulted in a draft merged goals system map comprising 39 goals. Twenty-six 
were utility company goals, eleven were regulator goals, and two were possible shared goals. 
The merged goals system was the focus of the third workshop, the purpose of which was to see if 
there was a basis for an effective collaboration. All of the links would be confirmed during the 
third joint workshop. See Figure 1 for the final agreed joint goal system consisting of 22 goals in 
different categories. 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
Shared Core Goals 
A key potential shared goal that emerged from both organizations¶ draft goals systems 
ZDV³HQVXUHWKDWWKHIDFLOLW\ZLOOEHVDIHUHOLDEOHDQGVHFXUHRYHULWVHQWLUHOLIH.´7KLVZDVQRW
only shared by both organizations, but was also at the center of the draft merged goals system 
network, indicating further that it was likely to be a shared core goal. This positioning resulted 
from the goal statement having many other goals supporting it, and it providing support for many 
others. In particular five goals supported it from the regulator, three goals supported it from 
utility company, and it supported two regulator goals and nine utility goals.  
The goals system in Figure 1 highlights this JRDO¶VVLJQLILFDQFHIRUERWKRUJDQL]DWLRQV,Q
building a goals system map, those statements (nodes) that are highly linked can be seen as 
central within the overall network. Moreover, positioning these statements in the center of the 
map enables a more understandable image as there are fewer links crossing one another. As 
shown in Figure 1, this shared goal has the greatest number of links (13). As a result of its 
centrality within the goals system and its importance to both parties (it was the most inter-linked 
for both organizations), this statement became the obvious starting point for negotiating the final 
combined agreed goals system. The second shared core goal was related, but had a much shorter 
WLPHIUDPH³EXLOGDIDFLOLW\WKDWLVDZRUOGOHDGHU´ and was not as central (10 links). 
Negotiations during the third workshop over the merged goals system led to the 
recognition that the shared core goals ± goals that were core for both organizations ࡳ  could not 
easily be achieved without collaborating with the partner. They are thus the most obvious sign of 
potential collaborDWLYHDGYDQWDJH,QRWKHUZRUGVWKH\GHPRQVWUDWH6DJDZDDQG6HJDO¶V
FRQFOXVLRQWKDW³LQERWKVHFWRUV>EXVLQHVVDQGWKHVRFLDOVHFWRU@SDUWQHUVKLSVKDYHEHHQD
ZD\WRH[SDQGFDSDELOLWLHVEH\RQGZKDWWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VRZQUHVRXUFHEDVHSHUPLWV´ 
The two teams were surprised to discover that they could achieve more as a result of 
working together. Instead of simply avoiding a dysfunctional relationship (i.e., avoiding, or at 
least managing, a negative-avoidance goal), they had managed to create a joint goals system that 
UHFRJQL]HGHDFKRWKHU¶VXQLTXHFRUHJRDOVDQGUHYHDOHGKRZWKH\FRXOGZRUNWRJHWKHUWRDFKLHYH
much more via the shared core goals. Needless to say, there were also core goals that belonged 
only to one of the parties. These incluGH³SURILWDELOLW\´DQG³FUHDWLQJDQH[SRUWPDUNHW´IRUWKH
XWLOLW\FRPSDQ\DQGIRUWKHUHJXODWRU³ZLGHUVWDNHKROGHUFRQILGHQFHLQWKHUHJXODWRU,´
³UHJXODWRUSURYLGHVWLPHO\SURSRUWLRQDWHWDUJHWHGDQGEDODQFHGUHJXODWLRQDGYLFHDQG
assessment,´DQG³Peet political expectations without compromising the regulator mission and 
YDOXHV´ 
The negotiated merging of the two separate goals systems showed complete interlinking, 
UDWKHUWKDQKDYLQJDUHDVZKLFKZHUHSUHGRPLQDQWO\RQHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VRUWKHRWKHU¶VThus, as 
FDQEHVHHQLQ)LJXUHZKLOHVRPHFRUHJRDOVZHUHSUHGRPLQDQWO\RQHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VWKH\KDG
support from goals of the other organization. As far as the participants were concerned, they had 
expected that there would be two well-separated goals systems with a few links between them. 
Instead, there were more causal links than anticipated and the presence of these showed 
interdependence between the regulator and utility company and the clear collaborative advantage 
to be gained by working together. Thus, even though goals statements that surfaced in each of 
the separate workshops differed, the links revealed similar meanings in the merged map based on 
the links in and out of goal statements.  
Public Value Goals Beyond Core and Shared Core Goals 
As noted earlier, the combined draft goals system contained 39 goals, including many 
that were unique to each organization and two potential shared goals. In addition, however, three 
of the most super-RUGLQDWHJRDOVIURPWKHXWLOLW\FRPSDQ\¶VLQLWLDOworkshop appeared to be 
public value goals; they were not core or shared core goals, but did deliver public value above 
and beyond the core goals. Importantly they did not undermine core goals. One example was 
³>KDYH@DWWKHHQG>RIWKHSURMHFW@SHRSOHVNLOOHGSURud and keen on doing more, leaving a skills 
OHJDF\´,WLVSHUKDSVQRWHZRUWK\WKDWDOORIWKHSRVVLEOHSXEOLFYDOXHJRDOVEH\RQGFRUHJRDOV
were developed by the utility company, even though the regulator, as a government agency, 
might have been expected to readily identify such goals. 
As the third workshop progressed, it became clear that the regulator team was 
comfortable supporting many of the potential public value goals beyond their core goals, 
regardless of the fact that their having emanated from the utility company. To some extent, these 
goals may have represented taken-for-granted goals on the part of the regulator, and thus not 
explicitly stated. Alternatively, the fact that the utility brought them up may reflect the greater 
autonomy a business may enjoy. Yet another alternative is that the regulator, like many public 
sector organizations, wanted to have its performance measured only against goals that it had a 
high degree of control over, rather than be criticized for not meeting goals it could only help 
achieve (Poister, Aristigueta, and Hall, 2014).  
Nonetheless, the regulator also realized that there were opportunities for helping achieve 
general societal goals beyond core goals of either organization and was willing to support their 
attainment. The energies and competences of collaboration could combine to create something 
that is of value to all, beyond core goals and shared core goals (Fisher, 2014). The regulator thus 
FOHDUO\DFFHSWHG³SXEOLFYDOXHVDUHQRWWKHH[FOXVLYHSURYLQFHRIJRYHUQPHQt, nor is government 
WKHRQO\VHWRILQVWLWXWLRQVKDYLQJSXEOLFYDOXHREOLJDWLRQV´%HFN-¡UJHQVHQDQG%R]HPDQ
2007: 374). Significantly, however, neither the government regulator nor the utility agreed to 
adopt explicitly and publicly these public value goals along with their associated performance 
indicators because they were not prepared to be held accountable for their achievement. Thus, 
while the parties were willing to contribute toward achievement of these goals, they were also 
not-my-goals for each organization as they were not prepared to be held individually responsible 
for their achievement. The map thus shows an overlap between public value goals and not-my-
goals. 
Discussion 
The case demonstrates that visual strategy mapping can help users figure out 
collaborative advantage in a relatively effective way, but only when used as part of an 
appropriately designed goal- and strategy-setting process. Too often the way senior management 
teams work together diminishes openness, fosters tentativeness, and discourages exploring 
creative ways of thinking about what might be achieved (Janis, 1989; Lencioni, 2002). 
Facilitating the consideration of shared core goals and public value goals is thus difficult. The 
W\SLFDO³legitimate´ focus of the group is on a debate about core goals, and this discussion is 
itself problematic. Because each member of a management team has his or her own at least 
partly unique view of the goals of the organization, any process of negotiation must allow for the 
surfacing of most if not all of the possible goals as part of negotiating a goals system. Careful 
meeting design, management, and facilitation are thus required to ensure effective idea 
generation, pragmatic reasoning and dialogue about cause-effect relations, and negotiated 
agreements on goal systems (Hodgkinson, et al., 2006; Innes and Booher, 2010; Ackermann and 
Eden, 2011).  
 An important purpose of this article is to suggest that part of the goal- and strategy-setting 
process should include explicitly encouraging consideration of all the proposed categories of 
goals, along with consideration of goals as a system. Otherwise, the role of different goals and 
their inter-relationships are less likely to be revealed or considered. Introducing the goal 
categories as possibilities to a group is therefore important. In addition, techniques are needed to 
bring these concepts to life and show their significance in the world of practice. We believe that 
visual strategy mapping is an effective technique for doing so, whether computer assisted or not.  
We believe the case of the regulator and utility company illustrates the potential merits of 
the proposed goal categories that go beyond the traditional conception of collaborative 
advantage. The possible public value goals beyond core goals identified by the utility company 
were ultimately supported by both organizations, except that for the regulator it was crucially 
important that they be seen as beyond their core goals and would not interfere with their ability 
to achieve core goals. Perhaps at least some government organizations find it more difficult than 
business organizations to acknowledge public value goals beyond core goals (Perri 6, 2005). 
Moore and Khagrom (2004, 6), for example, assert WKDW³JRYHUQPHQWPDQDJHUVW\SLFDOO\KDYH
much less discretion to define the purposes of their organizations, and the ways they intend to 
pursue those purposes.´ 
In arguing as we have, we are also acknowledging public values are stakeholder 
dependent. For example, in the utility±government regulator case, the public value of a skilled 
labor force would be of value to those who become skilled and to organizations wishing to use 
these skills, and to the general public in the region where unemployment will drop and the 
economy benefit. The general public in the country would be less concerned. 
Validating the Goals System 
It is all well and good for two or more management teams to reach agreement about a 
system of goals that includes shared core goals and public value goals beyond core goals, but do 
they mean it? Will they actually deliver, or are these just words? In other words, do the 
management teams view the goals systems and the agreements they embody as valid prior to 
implementation of the project. Validity in this case means being reasonable and cogent and 
having a sound basis in logic. Does the goal system represent a sound basis for the leadership 
work of providing direction, alignment, and commitment (Drath, et al., 2008)?  
A number of ways are available for testing the possibility that the agreements are not just 
simply espoused goals that will not be implemented. These indicators include: (1) the results of 
strategic risk assessment, (2) the meanings revealed by the statements and associated causal 
links, and (3) the nature of the performance indicators developed by the group tied both to the 
core shared goals and public value goals beyond shared goals. 
Strategic Risk Assessment. An agreement on the goals system is a fundamental aspect 
of agreeing on strategy.  When developing a strategy for a project of this magnitude, performing 
a risk assessment is typically the primary basis for negotiating strategies that will mitigate the 
key risks (and avoid negative-avoidance goals). For this reason the second part of each of the 
two initial workshops was devoted to eliciting risks that would compromise the attainment of the 
goals. The process used was similar to that for developing the goals system, where participants 
identified risks and causally linked them. Gradually a causal map developed that showed how 
risks were related, as opposed to the group developing a traditional risk register where risks are 
listed and their interactions ignored.  
If the agreed goals are meaningful then the strategic risks are most likely to be identified 
with regard to the most important goals, and especially with the negative-avoidance goals (cf. 
Webster and Stanton, 2015). A process of risk assessment in relation to achieving the goals 
therefore tends to surface and link real worries about delivering on the goals that a team is most 
keen to achieve.  
Risks of two kinds were identified during the initial workshops: (1) the risks that the 
other organizations would create, and (2) the risks created by their own organization. In the case 
of the utility and the regulator, the highest combination of risk impact and probability of 
RFFXUUHQFHZHUH³SURJUDPGHOLYHU\SUHVVXUHVDIIHFWTXDOLW\DQGVDIHW\´³ODFNRIFRQWURORI
conVWUXFWLRQDFWLYLWLHV´DQG³SHUVRQDOUHODWLRQVKLSVEUHDNGRZQDVLQFUHDVHGSURJUDPSUHVVXUH
EXLOGV´)RUERWKRUJDQL]DWLRQVWKHVHZHUHULVNVWKDWcould undermine what later became the 
FHQWUDOFROODERUDWLYHJRDORI³HQVXUHWKDWIDFLOLW\ZLOOEHVDIHUHOLDEle & secure over its entire life 
to meet our context in a fit-for-SXUSRVHZD\´DQGRWKHUJRDOVGLUHFWO\UHODWHGWRVSHFLILF
organizational goals that serve immediate stakeholders.  
7KXVQRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ZLVKWRDFKLHYHZLGHUSXEOLFYDOXHgoals, the risk 
focus was unsurprisingly on short-term, organization-specific JRDOV7KHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHDOHQHUJ\
was focused on the core goals of each organization rather than on goals beyond core goals. This 
encourages us to believe that the processes of negotiation and the outcome of the goal-setting 
reflected both a cognitive and emotional commitment for the participants to the goals system, but 
particularly to their own core goals, as might be expected. The public value goals were seen as 
good to achieve, but clearly ³DERYHDQGEH\RQG´FRUHJRDOV 
Vague Platitudes or Goals That Will Be Implemented? Relatedly, how do we know 
that shared core and public value goals beyond core goals will be goals-in-action rather than the 
typically very broad and vague goals that are agreeable to all parties, but unlikely to be very 
meaningful or implemented (Vangen and Huxham, 2012)? The strategic risk assessment and 
negotiated strategies for mitigation provided one check, in that the key strategies were identified 
and then causally linked to the agreed goals to demonstrate the goals-in-action. In this sense, 
ambiguous values/goals became less ambiguous when their means-ends context is clear (Beck 
Jørgensen and Bozeman, 2007, 357). In other words, instrumental goal ambiguity was reduced 
(see Rainey and Jung, 2015). Thus, the development of goals statements in the context of means-
ends relationships adds more realism than simply pronouncing nice sounding aspirations without 
a meaningful context. In the utility company and regulator case, the creation of a network of 
goals gave an action-oriented meaning to each of the goals and placed them in a meaningful 
network of goals (also reducing priority ambiguity; see Rainey and Jung 2015).  
$GGLWLRQDOO\WKHIDFLOLWDWRUV¶H[SHULHQFe with both teams in both a group and one-on-one 
individual settings meant they knew something of the meanings of non-verbal behaviors. The 
facilitators were thus able to gain a sense that the parties to the negotiation were sincere and the 
behaviors in the group setting mirrored behaviors and attitudes in other settings. As further 
evidence, the computer support system enabled anonymous expressions of commitment, as well 
as veto of potential agreements.  
The Impact of Performance Indicators. Often the creation of, and agreement to, 
performance indicators attached to each goal will clarify the operational meaning of the goal, 
even when the indicators are qualitative (reducing evaluative ambiguity; Rainey and Jung, 2015). 
The recognition of the tension created between the expectations of others and self-determination 
XVXDOO\SURYLGHVVRPHLQVLJKWLQWRFRPPLWPHQWOHYHOV:RUU\LQJO\DQ\FHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶V
emphasis on more quantifiable performance indicators and on austerity may drive down the 
overall effectiveness of the public sector in situations where collaboration is mandated or 
desirable (Perri 6, 2002). 
In the utility company±government regulator case, the regulator team was particularly 
keen to have its performance measured against goals that they felt they had a high degree of 
control over, meaning their core goals and shared core goals. This circumstance suggests that 
different types of performance indicators are required for evaluating public value goals beyond 
core goals. Eden and Ackermann (1998, 262), Provan and Milward ( 2001), and Innes and 
%RRKHUGLVFXVVFDVHVLQZKLFK³WUDFNLQJLQGLFDWRUV´ZHUHRUFDQEHXVHGWRHQFRPSDVV
different ways of measuring performance that go beyond core goals. Thus, while the 
collaborators agreed to the public value goals and see value in being able to measure their 
attainment, they do not take sole responsibility for it, as their attainment is too dependent on the 
work of others. They therefore just committed WR³WUDFNLQJ´SHUIRUPDQFH in relation to these 
goals, not to being held accountable for it.  
Conclusions 
We have presented an approach to figuring out multi-organizational collaborative 
advantage through the use of a specific set of goal-related categories and visual strategy mapping 
in facilitated group strategy-making sessions. The main contributions of this article to the 
collaboration literature ± and specifically to the theory of collaborative advantage ± are to offer 
potentially relevant goal categories and an explicit, operational way for collaborators to discover 
collaborative advantage.  
The approach may be particularly advantageous for achieving greater integration of 
public and private activities to develop a set of shared common goals associated with creating 
public value that neither government, non-profit, nor business organizations could  achieve on 
their own. Increasingly institutions beyond governments are recognizing they have public value 
obligations (Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman, 2007, 374), as acknowledged in the corporate social 
responsibility literature for decades (Crane and McWilliams, 2009) and also by the US federal 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V*RYHUQPHQW3HUIRUPDQFHDQG5HVXOWV0RGHUQL]DWLRQ$FWDQGLWVDVVRFLDWHG
performance management system (Moynihan, 2013), along with similar state and local 
government systems (Bryson, 2011). The collective impact movement (Kania and Kramer, 2011) 
also recognizes this and we believe the proposed goal categories and visual strategy mapping 
could help further government performance management, corporate social responsibility, and 
collective impact goals. Indeed, the approach to creating a joint goals system also can be used to 
inform and strengthen a range of important processes, including alternative dispute resolution 
processes, negotiated rule-making methods, policy negotiations, and so forth, since each might 
be helped by clarifying joint goals systems (e.g., %LQJKDP2¶/HDU\DQG1DEDWDFKL 
 The article helps highlight the possibility that a single-minded focus by public 
organizations on meeting their core goals alone can significantly diminish their potential for 
creating public value (c.f. Rosenbloom, 2014; Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg, 2014). The 
continual increase in scrutiny, emphasis on more quantifiable performance indicators, and 
pressure for austerity can drive down the overall effectiveness of government organizations by 
potentially making it harder to achieve shared core goals and public value goals beyond core 
goals (Perri 6, 2002; Patton, 2011). Interestingly, the utility-regulator case raises the possibility 
that in some circumstances it may be easier for a business to go above and beyond core goals 
than for a government organization, in that the utility contributed most of the public value goals 
beyond core goals to the collaborative endeavor.  
Our hope is that the proposed goal categories and visual strategy mapping might help 
alleviate some of the challenges of identifying means and ends for achieving core, shared core, 
and public value goals beyond core goals in situations of collaboration, networked governance, 
DQGD³KROORZVWDWH´0LOZDUGDQG3URYDQ2000, 2006). Put differently, we argue that the 
emerging approach to public administration should incorporate this more expansive, public 
value-regarding view of collaborative advantage into its theory and practices if it is to fulfill its 
potential. 
We used a two-party case to illustrate the approach, because presenting a more 
complicated multi-party case would have taken too much space. We think the approach clearly is 
applicable, however, to larger multi-party collaborations. More collaborators would mean 
additional workshops to allow each organization to clarify its own goals system. In our 
experience, most organizations do not understand their goals fully or as a goals system. 
Achieving this understanding first, before developing a goals system for the collaboration is 
important. More collaborators would also mean more workshop time for the whole group in 
order to determine the collaboration¶s goals system. Facilitators would also need more time in 
order to prepare a draft goals system for the collaborators to consider. 
 Even if the proposed goal categories and approach are presumed to have some merit, 
scholars are still likely to have a number of concerns. First, there is a need for greater conceptual 
clarity around the meaning of the goal categories and legitimate overlaps among them. Indeed, 
regardless of their utility for practitioners, some might argue that the categories of public value 
goals beyond core goals, negative public value consequences beyond core goals, negative-
avoidance goals, and not-my-goals are not legitimate goal categories; instead the idea of goals 
should be limited to what we are calling core goals and perhaps shared core goals.  
Second, scholars may question the reasoning behind the placement of arrows and their 
directionality. In response, we would say that the point is not whether the arrows placed by 
management teams can withstand scholarly scrutiny. The point is whether the conversation 
leading to the arrows was useful for the teams themselves in developing a reasonable and 
defensible way forward. Evaluating whether the resulting goals and strategies work during 
implementation is a different question.  
Third, scholars may reasonably assert that the goals in the maps are too ambiguous to be 
useful. We do not dispute that there is a certain degree of goal ambiguity in the maps. We would 
argue, however, that a certain amount of goal ambiguity at the beginning of a mapping session 
can be quite helpful, and that the use of the goal categories and the strategy mapping process can 
make an important contribution toward reducing directional, evaluative, and priority goal 
ambiguity to desirable levels for the management teams involved (Rainey and Jung, 2015, 83-
84).  
We also assert that the categories and process can help operationalize the concept of goal 
validity called for by Rainey and Jung (2015, 90, emphasis in original). We have made use of 
four ways of validating goals prior to implementation, including: 1) the fact that senior 
management teams developed and agreed to the goals systems; 2) the results of strategic risk 
assessment exercises; 3) the meanings revealed by the means-ends network statements and 
causal links; and 4) the nature of the performance indicators developed by the group. An 
additional important method of validation beyond the scope of this study is whether the goals 
embedded in the maps actually lead to useful strategies in practice, including learning about the 
appropriateness of the goals. In other words, scholars should take account of both ex ante and ex 
post goal validity. 
To conclude, we have introduced an approach to figuring out cross-organizational and 
cross-sector collaborative advantage. The approach makes use of visual strategy mapping in a 
facilitated group strategy making session and six categories of goals within a goals system. 
Collaborative advantage can be of two different types. The first is the conventional view, which 
defines collaborative advantage as shared core goals. The second is more expansive and more 
broadly public value oriented. The broader approach includes shared core goals and public value 
goals beyond core goals, while simultaneously taking into account negative public value 
consequences beyond core goals, and in certain circumstances negative-avoidance goals and not-
my-goals (depending on the specific goal). Collaborative advantage as indicated by shared core 
goals is thus a subset of the more expansive conception of collaborative advantage that takes a 
broader view of public value into account.  
We summarize our argument via a set of tentative propositions that double as hypotheses 
we believe merit further research: 
Proposition 1. In comparison with normal dialogue, potential collaborators using visual 
strategy mapping as part of a facilitated group strategy mapping session will have (1) a clearer, 
more complete, and systemic understanding of exactly what the potential collaborative advantage 
is, as that term is ordinarily understood; (2) how they might achieve it and with what risks; and 
(3) therefore have a better basis for deciding whether to proceed.  
Propositions 2. Potential collaborators using visual strategy mapping as part of a 
facilitated group strategy mapping session will have (1) a clearer understanding of the potential 
collaborative advantage that goes beyond core goals and shared core goals to create greater 
public value; (2) how they might achieve it and with what risks; and (3) therefore have a better 
basis for deciding whether to proceed.  
Testing these propositions poses a number of challenges for research. To fully test them a 
variety of methodologies will need to be used, including: action research, comparative case 
studies, natural experiments, and laboratory experiments. If the propositions are supported by 
further research, they outline an important way to improve collaboration, collaborative 
governance, and the creation of public value. Given the large and increasing importance of 
collaboration, and the clear evidence that it is hardly an easy answer to hard problems, anything 
that might make achievement of collaborative advantage easier is worth pursuing. 
 
Endnotes 
1 2XUDSSURDFKWKHUHIRUHLVQRUPDWLYHLQFRQWUDVWWR9DQJHQDQG+X[KDP¶V (2012) research aim 
of uncovering via grounded theory a set of dimensions with which to compare and contrast 
collaboration goals. The goal dimensions that emerged from their research are: level, origin, 
authenticity, relevance, content, and overtness.  
2 &RUHJRDOVDQGVKDUHGFRUHJRDOVDUHWKXV³PLVVLRQ-LQWULQVLF´DQGQRWWKHVDPHDVZKDW
5RVHQEORRPFDOOV³PLVVLRQ-H[WULQVLFSXEOLFYDOXHV´7KHVHODWWHUYDOXHVDUHW\SLFDOO\QRW
FHQWUDOWRDFKLHYHPHQWRIDSXEOLFRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VFRUHPLVVLRQ,QVWHDG, they usually relate to 
mandated general processes by which the organization is to pursue its mission; e.g., legal 
requirements affecting administrative procedures, transparency, due process, public notification 
and comment, and so forth. Performance measures may be tied to these mission-extrinsic values, 
but they would not be measuring performance directly related to the core mission.  
3 The visual mapping approach employed a software package called Decision Explorer that 
enables the data captured to be viewed according to the needs of the group. Thus it is possible to 
focus solely on issues/risks, goals, or any other category (www.banxia.com). The group support 
system (GSS) that was used is called Group Explorer. Group Explorer is a portable computer 
network system that allows participants to contribute their thoughts (statements and linking of 
statements) via a laptop computer and for their statements to be displayed as a network on a 
publicly viewable screen. The system does not discourage normal conversation, but rather allows 
time slots in which higher productivity, greater procedural justice (Tyler and Blader, 2003), 
anonymity, and experimentation are possible. The visualization or picture (network of 
statements) produced by the group can be continuously edited as conversation refines the 
material and agreements are reached. Group Explorer uses Decision Explorer to display and 
analyze material. For more information, contact co-author Colin Eden.  
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Table 1: Goal Categories and Collaborative Advantage 
Goal Type/Category Description Illustration from Utility-Regulator 
Case 
Shaded Area 
Represents 
Collaborative 
Advantage as 
Commonly 
Understood 
Shaded Area 
Represents the 
Broader Public 
Value-Focused 
Approach to 
Collaborative 
Advantage  
 
Core goals (primary) Goals that are at the core of, or 
central to an organization 
achieving its mandate 
[note: for a private organization 
these are goals that are expected 
to realize profit or shareholder 
value] 
For the regulator: ³GHYHORSJUHDWHU
SXEOLFFRQILGHQFHLQWKHUHJXODWRU´ 
For the utility: ³KDYHSURILWDEOHXWLOLW\´ 
  
Shared core goals Core goals shared by more than 
one organization made possible 
through collaboration 
³HQVXUHWKDWWKHIDFLOLWLHVZLOOEHVDIH
reliable, and secure over its entire life to 
meet our context in a fit for purpose 
ZD\´ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public value goals 
beyond core goals 
Goals valued by the public which 
extend benefits beyond any 
organizDWLRQ¶VFRUHJRDOVDQG
shared core goals and which no 
organization is willing to be held 
³DWWKHHQGPHPEHUVRIWKHSXEOLF
skilled, proud and keen on doing more, 
leaving a skills legacy: provide a social 
EHQHILWWRWKHFRPPXQLW\´ 
  
 
accountable for  
Negative-avoidance 
goals 
Goals which are likely or possible 
negative consequences of 
strategies to achieve other goals, 
and thus are risks that need to be 
assessed and possibly managed 
Hypothetical negative-avoidance goal 
QRWRQPDS³127RYHU]HDORXVVKXW-
GRZQV´ 
[note: this is likely to be a significant 
worry for the utility company and so 
something to be avoided at all costs] 
  
Depending on 
the specific 
negative-
avoidance goal 
Negative public value 
consequences beyond 
core goals 
Undesirable public value 
consequences generated by 
pursing strategies to achieve core 
goals and shared core goals. 
While they strategies may 
achieve core goals and shared 
core goals, they also yield 
negative public consequences. 
³127µWKHOLJKWVJRRXW¶´ 
[Note: the statement arose DVµWKHOLJKWV
JRRXW¶LVDSKUDVHXVHGLQWKHSRZHU
generation industry for the long term 
loss of enough power to keep the lights 
on. 7KHµ127¶ZDVLQVHUWHGE\WKH
group to recognize that the goal was to 
avoid this outcome] 
  
 
 
 
Not-my-goals In collaborations these are goals 
of other organizations which 
those not owning them are not 
prepared to be held accountable 
for 
³$OOVWDNHKROGHUVLQFWKHSXEOLFUHWDLQ
confidence in the regulatory process 
across all industries 
[Note: the regulator aimed to contribute 
to this goal but did not wish to be held 
accountable for their contribution, 
because they did not wish be held 
accountable for ALL stakeholders, 
across ALL industries] 
  
Depending on 
the specific not-
my-goal 
 
 
Exhibit 1. A Workshop Process for Discovering Collaborative Advantage  
Overarching purpose: Establish a joint goals system that identifies where working together 
can create outcomes that could not be achieved otherwise, while also acknowledging each 
organi]DWLRQ¶VJRDOVDQGKRZWKH\LQWHUDFWZLWKWKHJRDOVRIWKHRWKHURUJDQL]DWLRQV 
Set-Up (for additional details see Bryson, Ackermann, and Eden, 2014) 
x Gain agreement with the two organizational lead persons regarding the two-stage 
workshop design (as noted below) 
x Identify an appropriate room 
x Select participants  
x Agree on a timescale ± ideally no more than a week between each workshop 
Stage One: Separate workshops for each organizational team.  
Purpose: Develop an agreed-upon draft goals system that speOOVRXWµ:KDWZHZDQW¶JRDOVDQG
how the goals relate to each other. 
General Introduction to workshop 
Why use a computer-assisted group support system (GSS)? A GSS: 
x Provides all participants with wirelessly connected consoles that allow: 
o everyone to speak simultaneously 
o anonymity and therefore more openness 
x Supports groups in creating maps that reflect causality (means-ends and risk 
systemicity) 
x Enables easy and continuous editing of maps to reflect provides organisational 
memory subsequent to the workshop 
x enables hard copy production as and when required for each reference 
Activity 
1. 5HYLHZµUXOHVRIHQJDJHPHQW¶IRUH[DPSOHPRELOHSKRQHVRQVLOHQW 
2. Ask participants to use their consoles to capture individually: 
x What issues/risks they fear the other organization(s) might create 
x What issues/risks they think their own organization might create 
3. Begin to explore the links between the issues/risks using the material captured and roughly 
clustered into themes,. Doing so will aid development of a map that shows the 
LQWHUFRQQHFWLRQVEHZHHQLVVXHVDQGULVNVSRVHGWRRQH¶VRZQRUJDQL]DWLRQWKHRWKHU
organization(s), and the two organizations jointly.   
4. Explore the structure of the map identifying where there seem to be heavily linked clusters 
(potential themes) of material. Check the links¶ accuracy and comprehensiveness.  
5. Identify key risks (those risks which have many links into and out of them) and then use a 
Delphi technique to agree on impact and probability with respect to those risks.  
6. In the light of the risk map, and taking into account the priorities revealed through the 
Delphi activity, begin to identify the underlying goals as they are revealed through 
questioning what goals/objectives are threatened by the risks.  
Conclusion 
  Review the goals system and provide brief description re next steps 
Repeat with other organisation(s). 
Off-line work:  
1. Facilitators merge the two sets of material into a new model keeping a copy of the 
originals. 
2. Facilitators identify overlapping goals, cross-links between goals, and possible goal 
categories indicating shared goals in order to develop a single combined goals system 
map 
3. Facilitators identify emerging risk clusters/themes worth addressing with both groups 
4. Facilitators gain agreement from each organisation about what is to be declared from their 
own workshop 
Stage Two: Joint workshop to establish a shared goals system that clarifies the 
collaborative advantage of working together 
Purpose: Agree on the shared goals for the collaboration and how they relate to each other. 
Develop a draft goals system that recognizes the core goals of each organization and yet 
identifies shared goals, and especially those goals that could not be attained without 
collaboration. As part of the process, recognize goals that seek to avoid possible serious 
disasters, and goals that could benefit the wider community without hurting HDFKRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V 
core goals 
Introduction 
x Review of previous introduction, including use of the GSS and rules of engagement 
x Explain what has EHHQGRQHµRII-OLQH¶ 
Activity 
1. Explore and discuss emergent joint risk themes and identify possible joint risk mitigation 
strategies 
2. Explore and discuss emergent joint goals system created from initial workshops and off-
line work making sure to attend to negative-avoidance goals and public value goals 
beyond shared goals 
3. Agree on a joint goals system and draft risk mitigation strategies and their role in attaining 
goals 
Conclusion Agree on a one page summary statement and provide participants with hard copy. 
 
  
Figure 1: The Final Agreed Goals System Map. LEGEND: 5 unique core goals shown with no box; 1 negative public value goals 
beyond core goals shown as a rounded rectangle; 12 shared core goals shown as squared rectangles; 4 public value goals beyond core 
goals shown as ovals; and 1 not-my-goal shown as an oval with CAPITALIZED text 
 
